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I. Introduction
In recent years, human rights have been at the center of political and philosophical debates. Faith in liberal democracy and representative institutions seems to have been shaken by violations of fundamental 
rights, as happens with the case of refugees, minority groups and others. Such 
observation can be attested by the emergence of a vocal protest movement 
in the United States against racial discrimination and violence. Of course, 
the discourse on human rights is much older. Already since their enactment, 
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Abstract
Edmund Burke can perhaps be considered as the father of modern conservatism. Hannah 
Arendt was a very eclectic thinker who embraced ideas from the traditions of liberalism 
and republicanism. They both commented on the issue of the “Rights of Man” and rejected 
their abstract and metaphysical nature. And, it was Arendt who saw a ‘certain pragmatism’ 
in Burke’s ideas. Is this coincidence of opinion a surprising plot twist? An unintentional 
‘alliance’ against the naturalness of the “Rights of Man?” This paper first discusses the 
real relationship between Burke’s and Arendt’s theories on human rights. In the first part, 
the ideas of the two thinkers are presented and examined. In the second part, the main 
convergences and divergences are identified. Through a careful reading of the Burkean and 
Arendtian corpus, it is shown that Arendt agreed with Burke that human rights cannot be 
abstract or metaphysical. On the other hand, Arendt, being autonomous in her critique, 
argued for one universal and inalienable right, that is ‘the right to have rights,’ i.e. the right 
to belong to political community. In overall, the analysis endeavors to provide an answer to 
the question as to what degree did Arendt endorse Burke’s theories on the “Rights of Man.”
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the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
provoked different interpretations regarding their nature and scope of 
application.
In the field of political philosophy and intellectual history, Edmund 
Burke and Hannah Arendt are two thinkers who belong to divergent 
philosophical currents and lived during different historical periods. Burke’s 
philosophy correlates with the broader tradition of – British – conservatism 
while Arendt’s multifaceted and complex philosophy can be linked up 
to a certain degree to republicanism. Prima facie establishing a common 
ground between these theories appears to be almost impossible. However, 
a careful consideration of their works may offer certain surprises; because 
both Burke and Arendt criticized the doctrine of the “Rights of Man,” which 
was formulated according to the eighteenth-century notions of natural 
law. It should be noted that although they both rejected the abstract and 
metaphysical concept of the “Rights of Man,” and some philosophical debts 
to Burkean thought are traceable in the Arendtian corpus, the German thinker 
was creatively autonomous in her critique and made sure to adapt it to the 
post-war context of the twentieth century.1 
Indeed, Burke and Arendt formulated their theories against different 
historical backgrounds. On the one hand, Burke attacked the “Rights of Man” 
as formulated in the declarations of the French Revolution and espoused 
by radical English thinkers like Dr Richard Price and Thomas Paine.2 On the 
other hand, Arendt wrote her critique of natural rights after the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights had been adopted by the General Assembly 
of the newly founded United Nations in December 1948.3 As of such, Burke 
presented his arguments during the culmination of what became known as 
the ‘Age of Revolutions,’ while Arendt drafted her objections against the 
backdrop of the decline of the nation-state after the end of World War Two. 
As it will be shown below, Arendt’s critique of natural human rights followed, 
at least up to a certain degree, the arguments of Burke and Jeremy Bentham.4 
After all, it was the utilitarian philosopher who maintained that “rights” exist 
only “due to legislation.”5 At the same time, both Burke and Bentham agreed 
1 Arendt makes mention of Burke inter alia in her works On the Revolution and The Origins of 
Totalitarianism.
2 R. R. Fennessy articulated this debate in Burke, Paine, and the Rights of Men. A Difference of 
Opinion (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963).
3 Christoph Menke, Birgit Kaiser, and Kathrin Thiele, “The ‘Aporias of Human Rights’ and the 
‘One Human Right:’ Regarding the Coherence of Hannah Arendt’s Argument,” Social Research 
74, no. 3 (2007): 739.
4 Menke, Kaiser, and Thiele, 742.
5 Ibid.
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that “laws are always passed for particular nation-states.”6 Arendt, following 
the same line of thought, argued in favour of the connection between human 
rights and laws on the one hand and the tie of legislation to a certain ‘locale’ 
on the other.7 However, as it will be noted in the following sections, Arendt 
soon presented her alternative and potential solution to the problem posed 
by the ‘English’ critique of the “Rights of Man.”
In the following sections, the fundamental arguments of Burke and Arendt 
against the theory of the “Rights of Man” are first analyzed, as recorded in their 
cardinal works, the Reflections on the Revolution in France and The Origins of 
Totalitarianism respectively.8 Then, the convergences and divergences of the 
two theories are summarized, so as to provide some conclusions relating the 
position of rights in the philosophy of the two thinkers.
II. Edmund Burke on human rights
‘Human rights’ are intricately linked to unhistorical human nature. Therefore, 
they are natural rights “which do not exist only in law, but also independently, 
through binding precepts of morality that do not depend upon a legal code 
for their validity.”9 They were formulated as such in the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen, issued in 1789 by the French National 
Assembly, which thus placed “natural rights at the center of the new system 
of government.”10
For Burke though, all rights are ‘derived from historical development and 
recognized through positive laws and customary practice;’11 in other words, 
they originate from a particular tradition. Thus, it is evident that meant only 
within a certain political context, rights have their roots in the historically 
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Excerpts from other texts are noted where it is deemed proper. 
9 Roger Scruton, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 602-603.
10 John Morrow, A History of Political Thought. A Thematic Introduction (New York: New York 
University Press, 1998), 220. In her critique, Arendt not only mentioned the French but also the 
American Revolution to which Burke does not refer. According to Arendt, together with the 
French, the American Revolution established Human Rights as the basis of ‘civilized societies;’ 
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Cleveland, World Pub. Co., 1962), 
293. Furthermore, the American revolutionaries primarily focused their demands on “life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of bliss;” Ibid., 295, 298.
11 Morrow, 221. In his early work, A Vindication of Natural Society, Burke had already rejected 
the notion of natural society and the self-existent individuality of Man outside political 
society, because according to his analysis, human needs are met only within a specific political 
and social structure, see Scruton, Dictionary, 70.
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shaped human society, such as the English nation in Burke’s case.12 For 
the Anglo-Irish thinker, this also presupposes that they are not abstractly 
worded and based on speculative apriorisms. Besides, Burke displayed in most 
cases a general suspicion, if not rejection, of any theory claiming universal 
application.13 Furthermore, he argued that the theories of natural law and 
natural rights, which had been invoked by the enemies of arbitrary power in 
the seventeenth and early eighteenth-century, were the forerunners of the 
radical-revolutionary version of his contemporary France.14
Additionally, Burke maintained that laws sufficed to describe societal 
condition via a set of orders and prohibitions. He accused radicals like Thomas 
Paine of violent interference with the structure of society by the imposition 
of abstract theories on historical reality. For him, the result of these actions 
would be the eventual overthrow of all the pillars of political society.15
However, it should be underscored that Burke quite interestingly 
advocated natural law in line with the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition, 
which was not based on transcendent principles but was rooted in political 
society. At first glance, this position might seem to constitute a contradictio 
to the offensive against the “Rights of Man.” Nevertheless, one must bear 
in mind that the classical tradition of natural law did not focus on the right 
per se but on the linked duty, and that instead of Reason, it established 
Prudence as the foundation of rights.16 It is in line with this tradition that 
Burke referred to what he labeled ‘real human rights’ which had their roots in 
political society.17 Besides, Burke’s notion was not limited to rights protected 
by written law but extended to other privileges which in his time, at least, 
were not protected by specific rules but stemmed from tradition. To address 
this apparent antinomy, R. R. Fennessy pointed out that Burke had made a 
methodological distinction between rights as an individual privilege and rights 
in relation to others, endorsing the latter because only these exist within 
political societies.18 This is the essence of Burke’s real natural rights, and this 
12 Cf. Edmund Burke, “English Rights,” in Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. John 
Greville Agard Pocock (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 28.
13 Morrow, 372.
14 Ibid., 224.
15 Cf. his early satire, A Vindication of Natural Society, where Burke argued that Lord 
Bolingbroke’s deism would, eventually, not only lead to the overthrow of revealed religion 
and the established church but of political society, too.
16 On the essence of Prudence, Burke followed the Aristotelian tradition, according to which 
Prudence refers to the empirically acquired practical wisdom. On the other hand, the Platonic 
theory of Prudence is related to the knowledge of Ideas; Burke, 28, 30.
17 Fennessy, 138-139.
18 Burke shared Aristotle’s view that virtue is always practiced in relation to someone else as 
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can further elucidate the reasons behind his fierce rejection of the “Rights 
of Man,” condemning them as transcendent and unrelated to the state and 
society. Finally, Burke argued for the complexity of human nature and the 
various interpersonal relationships, that develop between the members of the 
body politic, and rejected the simplistic and vague wording of the French 
Declaration. In fact, he prophesied that such a proclamation could be used as 
a tool of despotism.19
In the following excerpt from his Reflections, Burke’s perception of rights 
is stated quite clearly:
Men cannot enjoy the rights of an uncivil and of a civil state 
together. […] By having a right to everything they want 
everything. Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to 
provide for human wants. Men have a right that these wants 
should be provided for by this wisdom. […] But as the liberties 
and the restrictions vary with times and circumstances and 
admit to infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upon any 
abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as to discuss them upon 
that principle.20
In this context, he turned against Dr Price, Priestly and the French philosophes, 
accusing them of presenting metaphysical theories, which were not based 
neither on history nor on tradition. Of course, Burke never formulated his 
own comprehensive theory of human rights. On the one hand, this is due to 
the fact that he rejected the very existence of natural human rights and, on 
the other, it is owed to the structural and stylistic peculiarities of his works; 
the publication of his parliamentary speeches in pamphlets and the letter form 
of many of his other works – like the Reflections – inevitably resulted into a 
fragmentation of his thinking. As a result, Burke did not produce any treatise 
of political philosophy, that is a clear and ‘watertight’ framework of onto-
political principles. Instead, he chose to compose texts with observations 
and thoughts on current issues, as is the case with the French Revolution.21 
Roger Scruton rightly noted that the complex and often literary style of 
Burke’s thought had not particularly aided the Anglo-Irish thinker at a time 
when closed philosophical systems had been still prevalent.22 In addition, this 
opposed to Plato, who envisioned the inner harmony of the three parts of the soul; Ibid., 139.
19 Burke, 101-102.
20 Ibid., 52-53.
21 Scruton, Dictionary, 69.
22 Roger Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein 
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topical nature of his writings creates additional problems of interpretation; 
often Burke, who had studied law, did not hesitate to deliberately distort the 
facts in order to provide for the validity of his allegations. 
Overall, according to Richard Bourke’s comprehensive analysis, Burke 
identified two cardinal dangers in the program of the French Revolution 
deriving from these ‘abstract’ and ‘transcendental’ rights. Following – 
utilitarian – jurisprudence, Burke underlined that the ‘French rights’ would 
eventually result in “self-government as a means of determining the shape 
of existing civil societies” and that they could “challenge the distribution of 
wealth in established societies.”23 Consequently, for Burke, these primordial 
rights were against the very essence of classical natural law.24 
III. The Arendtian theory of rights
Arendt’s theory of human rights is primarily based on an early article entitled 
“The ‘Rights of Man,’ What are They?” and the ninth chapter of the second 
part of the Origins of Totalitarianism under the title “The Decline of the 
Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man.”25
Arendt’s primary thesis is linked to the belief that there is no practicality 
in realizing human rights and that the very essence of these natural rights is 
very different from what eighteenth-century thinkers believed.26 Her theory 
was developed both as a criticism and an alternative to the notions of modern 
natural law and/or liberalism. As a result, it appears that Arendt took distance 
from eighteenth-century French revolutionaries and their conception of 
natural rights. 
For Arendt there is only one fundamental right, that is the right to “belong 
to the political community,” from which all other human rights derive.27 In 
the post-war world, Arendt produced this notion in which a person, like the 
refugee, is deprived of a “place on the planet that makes their views important 
and their actions effective.”28 This led Arendt to believe that rights exist only 
within certain state entities and are protected by enacted laws.
(London: Routledge, 2001), 223.
23 Richard Bourke, Empire and Revolution. The Political Life of Edmund Burke (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2015), 574.
24 Ibid., 574.
25 Hannah Arendt, “The ‘Rights of Man:’ What are They?” Modern Review 3 (1949): 24-37; 
Arendt, The Origins, 268-302.
26 Menke, Kaiser, Thiele, 740.
27 Arendt, Rights, 37; Serena Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity. A 
Phenomenology of Human Rights (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 11. 
28 Arendt, Rights, 29. The loss of state is tantamount to the loss of all rights, Parekh, 18.
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Endorsing Burke’s position, Arendt agreed that human rights, as 
articulated in the eighteenth-century, were, indeed, an ‘abstraction’ and 
she argued in favor of the ‘irreversible legacy’ of rights inherited from one 
generation to the next, as Burke’s ‘rights of the English;’ these are rights 
channeling from ‘nations.’29 Moreover, she believed that the “Rights of Man” 
were of the “order of an ‘ought,’ to which no ‘can’ correspond[ed].”30 This 
highlighted their metaphysical and utopian nature in Arendt’s perception.
The waves of refugees and ‘stateless’ people in the post-war world were 
important events which compelled Arendt to formulate her conception of 
human rights.31 In the German thinker’s argument, stateless people were those 
who had no recognized legal or political status.32 Of course, the emergence 
of this phenomenon was a very significant global problem which went far 
beyond totalitarian regimes.33 Besides, it was a phenomenon unknown to 
eighteenth-century philosophers and thinkers. Thus, it became clear in her mind 
that the loss of ‘national rights’ would lead to the consequent deprivation of 
all ‘human rights.’34 At that point the “world found nothing sacred in this 
abstract nakedness of being human,” she argued.35 Therefore, it can be said 
that for Arendt, having human rights means participating in a certain civic 
nation, which through written law protects the rights of its citizens.36 It is in 
29 Arendt, Rights, 31; Parekh, 24; Bridget Cotter, “Hannah Arendt and ‘The Right to Have 
Rights,’” in Hannah Arendt and International Relations, eds. Anthony F. Lang Jr, and John 
Williams, 95-112 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 96-97.
30 Menke, Kaiser, Thiele, 742.
31 Arendt, Rights, 31. Through her experience of being a stateless Jew and ‘foreign enemy,’ she 
realized how the twentieth-century bureaucracy was characterized by an absolute irrationality; 
Richard J. Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1996), 75. Characteristically, she writes that Kafka and not Weber understood correctly 
bureaucracy’s nature, Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1930- 1954, ed. Jerome Kohn 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1994), 73-74. These experiences were mainly recorded in 
Hannah Arendt, “We Refugees,” Menorah Journal 31, no. 1 (1943): 69-77.
32 Hannah Arendt, The Jew as Pariah, ed. Ron H. Feldman (New York: Grove Press, 1978), 65; 
Bernstein, 77. Arendt drew her arguments from her critique of the legacy of the Enlightenment 
and classical liberalism, which both had underlined the importance of ‘inalienable rights.’
33 Arendt, Origins, 459.
34 Arendt, Rights, 31.
35 Ibid., 31.
36 Bernstein rightly acknowledges that in the birth of modern nation-states an internal 
opposition prevailed between the two synthetic entities, the nation and the state. During the 
nineteenth - century, the internal contradiction of the Declaration of Human Rights between 
inalienable rights and the need to protect them by a state entity was alleviated. However, 
the undermining of the nation-state at the beginning of the twentieth - century together with 
the rise of imperialism and the First World War led to the disintegration of this guarantor 
of ‘inalienable rights.’ Then the invocation of Human Rights became politically weak and 
inapplicable, Bernstein, 79; Arendt, Origins, 291-292, 293.
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this respect that Arendt’s notion correlated with Burke’s human rights with 
their inalienable character guarantee only the status of savages to people.37 
Nevertheless, as will be indicated next, Arendt accepted one inalienable 
right, i.e. the right to have rights, which eventually constitutes her theory 
significantly different from Burke’s.
She further argued that even though people are not born equal, they 
become equal when they participate in political society, which in turn 
guarantees them equal rights.38 It has been righty observed that Arendt “was 
deeply skeptical of all those tendencies in modern life that foster a false 
sense of social equality and homogeneity.”39 Sharing republicanism’s view 
to a certain degree, Arendt offered the idea that there are no independent 
rights but only in relation to others.40 In this, she agreed with Burke who 
had argued in favor of rights in relation to others and not as an independent 
privilege. What is more, she emphasized that although rights arise from 
political community, there must be either an institution of a federation 
of states or international law to protect and secure their implementation. 
Thus, polity becomes the cornerstone of the Arendtian conception of 
politics. Moreover, Arendt noted that the various declarations of human 
rights demanded equal rights for “something essentially nonequal: human 
beings as natural beings. There are only equal rights for political members, 
which are thus not human rights.”41 It is this loss of polity that expels one 
from humanity.42 This idea of polity is interlinked with Arendt’s notion 
of dignity, which meant being a member of a political community, i.e. 
possessing that right to have rights. Put in Aristotelian terms, dignity for 
Arendt is the ability of human beings to speak and accordingly be political 
animals. Thus, dignity and polity are not ‘natural properties’ but rather a 
‘politico-linguistic experience.’43 
37 Arendt, Rights, 32.
38 Ibid., 33; Bernstein, 86; Arendt, Origins, 301.
39 Bernstein, 86.
40 Arendt, Rights, 34. As for Arendt’s dialectical and rather eclectic relationship with 
republicanism and liberalism, it must be underscored that to this day it remains unclassified, 
because she agreed to some extent with both traditions. In addition to the aforementioned 
republican view, she advocated the liberal notion of a private sphere and negative freedom and 
in contrary to Rousseau and others she did not believe that it is the true nature of the individual 
to be a citizen above anything else. An extreme example of her consistency to liberal positions 
can be found in her article on mixed schools, in which she advocated for the parental right to 
choose whether to send their children to these schools or not, “Reflections on Little Rock,” in 
Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn, 192-213 (New York: Schocken Books, 2003).
41 Menke, Kaiser, Thiele, 746.
42 Ibid., 752.
43 Ibid., 753.
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In the controversy between Burke and Paine over the “Rights of Man,” 
Arendt, in a perhaps surprising turn, sided with the former, arguing that “there 
is no period in history when the Declaration of Human Rights could find a 
response.”44 However, as already stated above, she was quick to remind that 
a universal and inalienable right did, in fact, exist. The right to belong to 
political community, although incomprehensible in Burke’s time, became 
imperative in the post-war world.45 Besides, the Declaration, in contrast to 
its American model, the United States Bill of Rights – which was endorsed 
by Arendt –, sough only to express ‘positive, primary’ rights in ‘opposition 
to political status,’ and replaced history with nature as a result.46 This 
contributed to pre-political rights to livelihood becoming the cornerstone of 
the new revolutionary regime in France. At the same time, in Arendt’s mind, 
this was also the inherent weakness of the new government.
IV. Convergences and differences
These are the most important points of the Burkean and Arendtian theories 
of the “Rights of Man.” A superficial reading may lead to the erroneous 
conclusion that the two theories are completely identical. However, this is 
not true because Arendt never fully adopted the Burkean position, although 
she vindicated crucial aspects of his reading of natural rights. A cogent 
comparison of Arendt and Burke on the topic of the existence of natural 
rights can, perhaps, launch a broader discussion on the naturalness of rights
It can be argued, that in principio both Burke and Arendt agreed that rights 
arise from political society and are not the product of nature. However, 
whereas Burke believed that they were the result of a particular community’s 
tradition and history, Arendt maintained that their implementation can be 
enforced only by supranational institutions and general principles, like polity 
and dignity.47 This is the first major divergence between the two theories, 
especially regarding Arendt’s mention of the international law’s critical role. 
There is another major difference between the two thinkers: Burke and Arendt 
interpreted differently the very concept of political society; Burke perceived 
civil society as a state edifice characterized by homogeneous ethnic features 
while Arendt described a community whose culture is purely political. This is 
crucial for their understanding not only of political community but for their 
notion of polity as well. This, eventually, extends into their cardinal point of 
difference regarding the existence of at least one universal or natural human 
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right; Burke denied its existence while Arendt accepted that such a right could 
exist.
Furthermore, a critical feature in differentiating Burke from Arendt is the 
subject of universality. It is true that they both criticized the abstract and 
metaphysical nature of the “Rights of Man.” But Arendt acknowledged one 
universal right without reducing it to the realm of the metaphysical. Thus, 
indeed the ‘right to have rights’ reveals a certain universality.48 Bernstein 
noted that “there is clearly a universal thrust in her claim that every single 
individual has (or ought to have) the ‘right to have rights.’ But this right 
becomes concrete only in the life of a particular community.”49 To this point, 
of course, Burke would disagree arguing against the existence of any natural 
human right outside the nation-state.
If one were to analyze Arendt’s phrase ‘the right to have rights,’ they 
would discover that the first part refers to the moral imperative of belonging 
to a political community while the second part refers to the right to equal 
participation in the public sphere, which in turn presupposes independence 
from arbitrary interference in the private sphere.50 Α careful examination of 
the Arendtian text would also highlight the lack of a particular subject – in 
other words, who is the holder of this right? In order to understand Arendt’s 
point, one must return to her ontology. Because, based on the concept 
of humanity, the ontological foundation of her view is the principium of 
natality, which claims universal application.51 In Arendt’s thought, humanity 
approaches the notion of international law which should govern all human 
communities and affairs.52 Put in such terms, there is a certain paradox in the 
Arendtian rights. On the one hand, they are established on the international 
principle of humanity which arises from earthly human condition and seeks 
universal application, while, on the other, they are concrete and not of an 
abstract nature. The universality of ‘the right to have rights’ is the result of 
the Arendtian ontology, as analyzed in The Life of the Mind, where the law 
of the Earth corresponds to plurality and is linked to the community and not 
the individual.53 Whatever might be the true nature of Arendt’s rights, it is 
48 Arendt, Origins, 296-297; Peg Birmingham, Hannah Arendt and Human Rights. The 
Predicament of Common Responsibility (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 2006), 1; Parekh, 29.
49 Bernstein, 84.
50 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003), 56-57.
51 Birmingham, 4, 6, 39.
52 Here Birmingham identifies the influence of Augustine; cf. Ibid., 36.
53 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978), 20; 
Bernstein, 82. For Arendt, humanization begins with the integration of the individual into 
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evident that their very mention of universality renders them of a very different 
character from Burke’s ‘rights of the English.’ 
As for these ‘rights of the English,’ Arendt accepted them in principle, 
although she noted that this Burkean view almost reached the notion of ‘a 
race of blue-blooded aristocrats.’54 The basis of Burke’s conception was for 
Arendt the ancestor of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries racial theories. 
Of course, it must be said that Arendt did not make justice to Burke’s ideas 
since they were by no means characterized by any hint of racism. On the 
contrary, Burke not only supported the rights of Catholics but also devoted 
almost two decades of his life vindicating Indians and prosecuting Warren 
Hastings. Finally, he belonged to the more moderate political connection of 
his time, the (Rockingham) Whigs. 
Lastly, the issue of equality divides Burke’s and Arendt’s theories. The 
German thinker disagreed with Burke on the equality of citizens. Starting 
from the common point that humans are not born equal, the two thinkers 
followed different paths. As noted above, Burke never believed nor argued 
for the natural and legal equality of all people. Arendt on her part held the 
opinion that it is participation in political community that rendered people 
equal to each other, even if they had not been born equal.
Overall, regarding the similarities and divergences between the two 
theories, it can be argued that, perhaps, the most striking common feature is 
their rejection of the abstract, metaphysical, and inalienable “Rights of Man.” 
This is a rather interesting plot twist and coincidence of opinion between two 
very different thinkers. Where one might expect Arendt to be in agreement 
with Paine she/he finds her supporting Burke’s opinions. But this is, also, 
perhaps the only major point of genuine philosophical convergence. 
As noted above, Arendt acknowledged the existence of one human right, 
that is the right to have rights, or, in other words, the right to belong to a 
political community. Consequently, this fundamental human right became a 
cornerstone for her notion of ‘dignity.’ Burke on his part never accepted the 
existence of such a fundamental ‘human right.’55 Furthermore, Arendt’s only 
real human right was developed in an attempt to override this very ‘English’ 
critique of the “Rights of Man.”56 Burke, Bentham, and other critics of the 
a community, where one actively participates. On the contrary, world-alienation, which 
characterized refugees, is for Arendt the ‘hallmark of the modern age;’ Hannah Arendt, The 
Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 254. Again, here the loss 
of participation in the community is tantamount to the loss of fundamental features of our 
humanity.
54 Birmingham, 46.
55 For more on Arendt’s concept of dignity see Menke, Kaiser, Thiele.
56 Menke, Kaiser, Thiele, 750.
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French Declaration, argued, that all rights were based on laws passed in 
specific nation-states. As of such, no human right could exist outside these 
said political communities. But with Arendt’s notion that “each individual 
human being, as members of an eventually universal and (quasi-) political 
community: the ‘political entity’ of ‘mankind,’” this problem was solved.57 
This is where Arendt departed from the earlier English theory and formulated 
her own alternative of the ‘right to have rights.’
V. Conclusion
In the second and third subjection a brief overview of Burke’s and Arendt’s 
theories against the “Rights of Man” was presented. Then, in the third part 
an attempt was made to identify those points of the Burkean argument from 
which Arendt took her insight against the “Rights of Man” but also the point 
of her departure from the ‘English critique’ of the French Declaration.
In conclusion, it should be underlined that Isaac is right to remind that 
Arendt recognized a certain pragmatism in Burke’s theory. But that does 
not mean that she fully endorsed the philosophical basis of his claims.58 
Burke was a conservative and Arendt was a follower of republicanism and/
or liberalism. As of such the real relationship of their respective approaches 
is very complicated and by no means unambiguous.59 What might possibly be 
closer to the truth is that Arendt, being an eclectic thinker, chose to support 
part of her arguments against the “Rights of Man” on Burke’s opinions but at 
no point did she decide to embrace the whole of his philosophy. In fact, she 
quickly became autonomous in her critique and even proposed a solution to 
the problem of natural rights. 
Burke proposed history and tradition, the ‘rights of the English’ as the 
only viable alternative to the French natural rights. Arendt agreed with him 
that the essence of the “Rights of Man” was rather abstract and metaphysical. 
Being of such nature they could not protect the victims of twentieth-century 
totalitarianism. But for her the historical ‘rights of the English’ were also 
inadequate to face the novel challenges of the post-war world. What Arendt 
counter-proposed was a unique, real human right, that is the ‘right to have 
rights’ or ‘to belong to a political community.’ Her alternative sought to 
alleviate both the problems of the “Rights of Man” metaphysical nature and 
of the respective ‘English critique.’ Finally, this partial coincidence of opinion 
57 Ibid., 751.
58 Jeffrey C. Isaac, “Hannah Arendt on Human Rights and the Limits of Exposure, or Why Noam 
Chomsky Is Wrong about the Meaning of Kosovo,” Social Research: An International Quarterly 
69, no. 2 (2002), 511.
59 Birmingham, 45.
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between Burke and Arendt vindicates the subtle and complex nature of their 
thinking and the fact they both were quite creative in formulating their ideas.
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